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Abstract: This paper attempts to examine the effect of ownership 
structures, corporate performance and board political connectedness 
on CEO selection. The sample of the study is all Nigerian non-financial 
firms from the year 2011 to 2015 consisting of 72 CEO selection 
events. This study uses logistic regression analysis to provide 
evidence that firms dominated with blockholder ownership favour 
external successors while managerial ownership-controlled firms are 
inclined to select internal candidates as successors. However, this 
study fails to support the argument that corporate performance and 
board political connectedness do influence the choice of CEO selection 
in the Nigerian public listed companies. In sum, the findings suggest 
that blockholders and managerial ownership significantly influence the 
choice of the origin of the successor CEOs in the Nigerian corporate 
landscape. This paper enriches the literature about CEO selection 
choices in developing economies with weak corporate governance 
structure like Nigeria. In addition, the findings from this study could be 
of immense benefit to the shareholders and corporate board members 
in making a decision on recruiting their CEOs; and the regulatory 
agencies in the formulation and enforcement of reforms that guarantee 
good corporate practices by the boards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
CEOs occupy the most strategic position in corporations. As such, they are in a vantage 
position to take corporate decisions and executive day to day business of the corporations 
on behalf of the shareholders. In the course of discharging this onerous task, conflict of 
interests might arise between the CEOs and the shareholders. To mitigate this agency 
problem as suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983); Jensen and Meckling (1976) CEO 
successions which as suggested by providing a means for assessing the efficacy of a 
leader in shaping a firm’s fortunes is relied upon (Ishak, Ku Ismail, & Abdullah, 2013). 
Thus, with an effective succession plan in place, CEOs of the firms are more likely to 
pursue the interest of the shareholders (Nguyen, Locke, & Reddy, 2014). 
  Meanwhile, in deciding to hire or appoint an internal or external candidate as the new 
CEO, corporate performance, board structure, and ownership structure usually moderate 
the choice of the origin of the successor Ishak et al. (2012). Hence, this study examines 
the influence of corporate performance, board political connectedness and ownership 
characteristics on CEO selection in Nigerian PLCs.   
  Furthermore, ownership characteristics influence CEO selection, and this influence 
varies considerably across the markets. This is mainly due to the differences in the 
markets and the contexts in which the various studies were conducted (Nguyen et al., 
2014). For instance, developed economies with strong capital markets and developing 
markets with weak corporate governance mechanisms. This study attempts to investigate 
the influence of ownership characteristics (blockholders and managerial ownership) on 
the CEO selection in the Nigerian corporate market. This is important because most 
studies on corporate ownership and CEO succession relationship have concentrated on 
the developed market (Cheng, Hu, & Saffar, 2014; Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Guo & 
Masulis, 2015). Only very few studies have looked the emerging economies with none on 
the African subcontinent (Ishak, Ku Ismail, & Abdullah, 2013; Rachpradit, Tang, & Ba 
Khang, 2012). Also, Nigeria is the most significant emerging economy in Africa and its 
corporate market dominated by blockholders, and managerial ownership will be very 
relevant for this study. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and formulates the suitable 
hypotheses. While Section 3 discusses the research method and Section 4 presents the 
results and discussions. Finally, Section 5 provides the conclusion of the study.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
This section discusses the review of relevant literature and formulation of the suitable 
hypotheses to uncover the influence of corporate performance, board political 
connectedness and ownership structure on the CEO selection. 
 
2.1 CEO Selection 
 
Selecting and replacing of the CEO is one of the primary responsibilities of a company’s 
board of directors (Jenter & Lewellen, 2010), and this task is usually carried out through a 
standing committee of the board; the nominating committee (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, & 
Lafond, 2006; Ogbechie, 2012). Therefore, whatever choice of a successor the boards 
make has significant consequences on the company's future direction, strategies, and 
structure (Ishak et al., 2012). This is because CEOs occupy the most strategic position in 
the corporations. Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos (2011) classified CEO succession into 
insider and outsider succession and Kim (2011) defined inside succession as the 
successor originating from within the firm while the outside succession is when the 
successor is recruited from outside the firm. There is no consensus opinion among the 




researchers on the determinants of appointing an external or internal CEO. While some 
scholars like Fatima, Goergen, and Mira (2014) argue that external successor is usually 
appointed when the change was due to poor performance and an internal CEO will be 
selected following the excellent performance. On the contrary, Ishak et al. (2012) based 
on their study on the determinants of external versus internal succession in Malaysia 
concluded that poor firm performance would not necessarily result to external CEO 
selection choice. They suggest that some other factors such as board composition, firm 
ownership, and sociopolitical factors could be moderating the relationship between poor 
firm performance and external succession.  
 Larcker, Miles, and Tayan (2014) identify the following four approaches generally 
adopted in the selection of CEOs. (1) CEO-in-Waiting: In this approach the firm promotes 
a prospective candidate to the rank of Chief Operating Officer (COO) where he/she will be 
groomed to eventually ascends to the position of the CEO (2) Internal Development: This 
method allows the company to identify pool of potential candidates from within the firm 
and establishes a developmental plan for every one of them. Subsequently, the most 
viable candidate is elevated to the position of CEO. The third approach is external 
recruitment: The company hires or employs the CEO from outside the company. This 
approach is mostly adopted when the company lacks qualified and competent talents 
internally, or the organization needs a turnaround that requires significant strategic and 
operating change. The fourth and final approach is referred to an inside-outside approach. 
The firm combines the internal development plan with the external search. This method 
enables the firm to compare the leading internal candidates with the external candidates 
from the market and select the most competent and qualified individual.  
 Meanwhile, there are four theories that are mostly suggested in the discussion of 
managerial succession. These are; adaptive, inertial, scapegoating and contingency views 
(Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Gangloff, Connelly, & Shook, 2014; Ishak et al., 2012). 
However, none of the views exclusively perfect in addressing the succession issues. Thus, 
Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) observed that none of the adaptive and the inertial view was 
able to explain outsider selection. Hence, the contingency view which centered on the 
sociopolitical approach to CEO succession process received current attention.  
 
2.2 Firm Performance 
 
The relationship between firm performance and CEO selection had gained prominence 
because it has over time been used as a means for assessing the efficacy of a leader in 
shaping a firm’s fortunes (Custódio et al., 2011). It equally serves as a measure of the 
effectiveness of management of the firms (Dimopoulos & Wagner, 2012; Ishak, Ku Ismail 
& Abdullah, 2013 and Cook, 2015). Scholars have argued that probability of selecting 
outside CEO decreases as corporate performance improves (Park & Rozeff, 1996) and 
that external appointments are more likely in either of forced or voluntary successions 
when the accounting performance level is low relative to that at other firms within the 
industry (Parrino, 1997). In this situation, outside candidates are believed to be better and 
more qualified to be selected than insiders. However, some scholars maintained that, even 
in the event of succession following the poor firm performance, insiders are more preferred 
as a replacement to the removed or retired CEO (Ishak et al., 2012; Parrino, 1997). They 
argued that this is as a result of the size and structure as well as the difficulties in altering 
the strategies of the companies and if the anticipated benefits from an external selection 
are not sufficient to outweigh the costs (Gangloff et al., 2014; Parrino, 1997). Hence, in 
line with the preceding arguments, the study hypothesizes that:  
 




H1: Firms are more likely to choose external candidates as new CEOs in the event of poor 
performance. 
 
2.3 Board Political Connectedness 
 
According to the resource dependence theory developed by Pfeiffer and Salancik (1978), 
political connections can assist companies to obtain crucial resources, ability to withstand 
various external uncertainties that will increase firm value. However, the agency theory 
proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that politically connected boards may 
work against maximizing the shareholders’ wealth. This raises the further question of 
whether the politically connected board may relate to the better quality of corporate 
governance. Various researchers have measured political connectedness using different 
measures and proxies. For example, honorific titles given to distinguished individuals by 
the king or the state sultans in Malaysia such as Datuk, Tun, and Sri are measures of 
prominence or political connectedness (Ku Ismail & Abdul Manaf, 2016). In addition, when 
the CEO or Chairman of a firm is/ was an official of the government or an officer in the 
military or simply anyone with political standing either at the state level or ministerial is 
referred to as politically connected (Chan, Dang, & Yan, 2012).  
 Several researchers have argued that politically connected firm or board have weak 
and poor governance mechanism and are susceptible to deviate from the corporate goals 
of the firms and pursuing political interests. They are prone to entrenchment by the 
politically connected executives with weak board monitoring and lack of supervision by the 
board (You & Du, 2012; Kang & Zhang, 2015). The politically connected board are viewed 
as poor quality corporate directors, they miss board meetings and are less knowledgeable 
about the functions and role of the board of directors. Hence, the board may not carry out 
its function of selecting or recruiting a suitable CEO from the external source to turnaround 
the fortune of the firm. Thus, they neglect their core duty of succession planning for the 
firm (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Ogbechie, 2012). 
 Furthermore, in the event of selecting or hiring a CEO, the politically connected firms 
are not likely to hire from the outsiders, because of the connectedness of the board 
members, they are more likely to appoint a replacement from within their clique or network 
due to poor governance inherent in the connected board (Barnea & Guedj 2007). You and 
Du (2012); and Kang and Zhang, (2015) argue that politically connected firm or board 
have weak and poor governance mechanism and are susceptible to deviate from the 
corporate goals of the firms and pursuing political interests. They are prone to 
entrenchment by the politically connected executives with weak board monitoring and lack 
of supervision by the board. These inherent drawbacks make them inclined to select 
insiders as their CEOs. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: 
 
H2: Firms with politically connected board members are less likely to appoint outsiders as 
their CEOs.  
 
2.4 Blockholder Ownership 
 
Blockholder is a crucial internal corporate governance mechanism. It aligns the interests 
of the shareholders and the managers as well as reduces the agency problem. It is the 
percentage of shares owned by individuals or institutions which is from 5% and above 
(Acero & Alcalde, 2014; Goyal & Park, 2002; Xie, 2014). Blockholders are essential to a 
well-functioning corporate governance system because they have the financial interest 
and independence to assess the firm management and scrutinize the policies objectively, 
and they can put pressure on the management if they notice self-serving behaviour 




(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Ishak et al., (2012) who studied some sampled Malaysian 
firms, reported that from the logistic regression analysis of 145 succession events from 
the year 2002 to 2005, found that blockholders controlled companies favour outside 
candidates as successors when the performance is low. This is because blockholders are 
independent of the board and are not influenced by the monitoring of the management. 
 Therefore, when selecting a successor, an outside candidate will be more likely to be 
selected by the firms dominated by blockholder ownership. This is because the 
blockholders have the financial power and interest to hire an outsider to check the self-
serving behaviour of the management and protect the wealth of shareholders. In addition, 
they believe the outside CEO will bring about the desired changes in the policies and 
strategies which will improve the performance of the firm especially as the new CEO is not 
a part of the existing management (Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 1996; Ishak et al., 
2012; Parrino, 1997; Thanh & Heaney, 2013).  
 Several researchers have argued that blockholder ownership improves the 
effectiveness of board monitoring and it equally mitigates management entrenchment 
which ultimately increases the probability of outsider successor. Agrawal et al. ( 2012) 
report a positive relationship between the blockholder and CEO succession-performance 
sensitivity. This is in line with the opinion of Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (1996) that 
only outside selection benefits shareholders and that insider succession does harm the 
shareholders. Therefore, blockholders ownership favour external candidates as 
successors to preserve their wealth. In other words, the presence of blockholder 
ownership increases the probability of outside CEO selection. This is because; 
blockholder ownership resist management entrenchment and leads to a high probability 
of selecting outsider as new CEO (Park & Rozeff, 1996) because shareholders tend to 
benefit more from the appointment of an outsider as new CEO than when an insider is 
elevated to that position (Borokhovich et al., 1996). Hence this study hypothesizes thus: 
 
H3: Firms with blockholders are more likely to appoint an outsider successor as their 
CEOs. 
 
2.5 Managerial Ownership 
 
Managerial ownership otherwise referred to as insider ownership or director shareholding 
is the total shares held by members of the board of directors of the company (Tsegba, 
Herbert, & Ene, 2014). Managerial ownership reduces agency costs as it aligns the 
managerial interest with that of the shareholders, however, higher ownership by the 
managers could lead to entrenchment of the management which will ultimately affect the 
firm performance and weaken the governance mechanisms of the corporation (Tsegba et 
al., 2014).  
 Hornstein (2013) find that, the higher the managerial ownership level in a firm, the 
lower the probability of CEO succession. However, with a very high degree of managerial 
ownership, managers’ interests are aligned with those of the shareholders. Hence it 
heightened CEO turnover and followed with insider replacement as successor to protect 
their interest (Ishak, 2010; Ruan & Tian, 2011). Therefore, when selecting a successor in 
the event of a turnover, the managers through the power gained by the share ownership, 
they equally gain control over the firms and as such can influence decisions regarding 
appointment of their successor which will most likely be an insider in order to preserve 
their interest and control over the firm (Ishak, 2010). This study, therefore, suggests the 
following hypothesis: 
. 




H4: Firms with managerial ownership are not likely to select outsider successors as their 
CEOs. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
The methodology used in this study is based on secondary data and is panel data mainly 
sourced from the audited annual reports of the public listed companies in Nigeria and 
corporate announcements from the website of the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). The 
study covers all the non- financial public listed companies in Nigeria within the period of 
2011 to 2015, focusing on those companies that have appointed new CEOs within the 





Where; the measurement of variables is as explained in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Measurement of Research Variables and Main Sources of Data 
 
 Variables Label Descriptive Measurement 
Main 
Sources Reference 
Dependent Variables  
1. CEO Selection CEOSELECTION Dummies:  
1 = Outsider the company  




Independent Variables  
1.  Performance PERFM Proxied as profit before 
interest & tax/Book value 
of total assets (ROA) and  
Data 
stream 
Ishak et al., (2012) 
   equity + debt capital/Book 





2.  Political 
Connectedness 
BPCON The proportion of 
politically connected 
members on the board.  
Annual 
Reports  
Chan, Dang, and 
Yan (2012) 








MOWN Proportion non-executive 
members on the board.  
Annual 
Reports 
Guo and Masulis 
(2015) 
Control Variables  
1. Firm Size  FSIZE Log of the book value of 
total assets  
Data 
Stream 
Ishak et al., (2012) 




Ishak et al., (2012) 
3.  Firm Age FAGE Natural logarithm for the 






4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
For univariate tests carried out on this study, continuous measures like mean, median, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation were analyzed to highlight the descriptive 
characteristics of the sample. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent 
variables considered in this study. The proxy used for firm performance is ROA. This 
accounting-based performance is more informative and more appropriate for CEO 
succession studies than the market-based performance (Rachpradit et al., 2012). The 




mean for the ROA for the full sample is 0.004, and that of outsider companies is 0.002, 
both are lower than that of insider firms which are at 0.006. All the means of ROA for all 
the categories have positive value, indicating that on average all the sample firms have 
healthy financial status. There is a significant difference in the means of blockholder 
ownership in all the categories of the sample. For the full sample, the mean is 55%, while 
the outside selection and insider successor companies are 60% and 50% respectively. 
This result suggests that firms with blockholder ownership are likely to select outsiders as 
their CEOs. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
Variables Full sample (N= 72 Companies) Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev 
ROA 0.004 0.035 -0.933 0.207 0.151 
BPCON 0.171 0.121 0.000 0.667 0.170 
BHOWN 54.946 58.820 0.000 94.890 26.283 
MGOWN 11.749 1.335 0.000 74.700 19.998 
FSIZE (million) 70.100 13.700 0.094 1110.000 164.000 
LFSIZE 16.537 16.429 11.450 20.828 1.881 
FAGE 40.208 42.500 5.000 91.000 18.826 
 
Variables Outside Selection (N= 37) Inside Selection (N = 35) Mean Median Std. Dev Mean Median Std. Dev 
ROA 0.002 0.048 0.195 0.006 0.022 0.086 
BPCON 0.172 0.125 0.169 0.170 0.111 0.174 
BHOWN 59.693 61.720 24.805 49.928 55.400 27.215 
MGOWN 8.779 0.450 18.795 14.890 4.420 21.008 
FSIZE (million) 94.500 28.400 208.000 44.400 10.500 95.700 
LFSIZE 16.869 17.163 1.918 16.187 16.169 1.802 
FAGE 36.432 39.000 17.471 44.200 44.000 19.621 
 
Furthermore, the sample is categorized into three categories, namely; the full sample, 
outside selection and inside the selection. Table 3 presents the descriptive characteristics 
of CEO selection by year, sector, performance, ownership structure and company 
attributes (size, diversity, and age). As shown in Table 3, out of the total of 72 CEO 
turnover that occurred within the period of this study, 37 cases representing 51% selected 
outsider successors while 35 equivalents to 49% of the cases selected insider successors. 
This result implies that for the CEO turnover events that took place in the Nigerian 
corporate environment, they were replaced with approximately equal numbers of internal 
and external successors. That is, there was no much difference in the number of the new 
CEOs appointed from inside or outside the firms. Panel A of Table 3 reveals that 
companies preferred insider successors in years 2011 and 2013 as the percentage of 
insider selections are 68.75% and 63.64% respectively. While in the years 2012, 2014 and 
2015 the firms preferred outsider successors as a replacement for changed CEOs. This 
fact is reflected in the percentage of the outsider selection in these years; 2012 (64.29%), 
2014 (60%) and 2015 (62.505%) accordingly.  
 According to classification by sectors, as reflected in the panel B, the majority of the 
sectors favour selection of insider successors except for industrial goods and consumer 
goods sectors which preferred outsiders as 62.5% and 68% of CEO selections come from 
outside the firms for industrial goods and consumer goods respectively. This may be 
because of the homogenous nature of the firms and the spread of the firms within these 
sectors. In addition, most of the firms within these sectors are usually large, hence more 
access to a vital human resource from the external environment.  
 




Table 3. Sample Characteristics 
 





PANEL A Year: 
   
  2011 5 11 16 
  2012 9 5 14 
  2013 4 7 11 
  2014 9 6 15 
  2015 10 6 16 
PANEL B Sector: 
   
  Agriculture 1 1 2 
  Conglomerates 2 3 5 
  Construction/ Real Estate 2 3 5 
  Consumer Goods 15 7 22 
  Healthcare 2 4 6 
  Industrial Goods 10 6 16 
  Natural Resources 2 1 3 
  Oil and Gas 2 7 9 
  Services 1 3 4 
PANEL C Performance: 
   
  High Performance (+ ROA) 27 26 53 
  Low Performance (- ROA) 10 9 19 
PANEL D Ownership Structure: 
   
  Blockholders 35 31 66 
  Non-Blockholders 2 4 6 
  Managerial 33 32 65 
  Non- Managerial 4 3 7 
PANEL E Firm Characteristics: 
   
  Firm Diversity (more than 2 segments) 24 15 39 
  Firm Diversity (one business segment) 13 20 33 
  Firm Age (Above average > 40 years) 17 21 38 
  Firm Age (Below average < 40 years) 20 14 34 
 
Classification based on performance as depicted in panel C of Table 3, shows 27 out of 
53 representing 51% of companies with positive performance select outsiders as a 
replacement while 49% select insider replacements. Meanwhile, 53% of the firms with low 
performance (negative ROA) select outside CEOs. This result suggests that firms with 
poor performance are inclined to select outside CEOs which is consistent with the adaptive 
view of CEO selection that outside succession will attract investors ‘attention which could 
increase firms’ future performance. Panel D of Table 3 shows that outside succession is 
most preferred in the blockholder controlled companies. From a total of 66 successions in 
blockholder dominated firms, 35 representing 51% come from outside the companies. 
Managerial ownership-controlled firms also show a similar result as 33 out of 65 which is 
51% of the successions come from outside sources.  
 Firms with m two and above business segments tend to select outside successors as 
compared to those with just one line of business. As reveal in Table 3 panel E, out of a 
total of 39 companies with multiple business segments, 24 of them representing 62% 
select their CEOs from external sources. This may be due to the complexities like the 
operations of the firms thereby making it difficult to get adequate capable hands. 
Therefore, more competent candidates are hired from outside the firms as successors. 
Meanwhile, the majority of those firms that have a single business outlet prefer insider 
successors. As indicated in panel E, 20 out of 33 firms with a single business segment 
select insider as a replacement for their CEOs, this fraction represents 61% of all the 
companies that operate a single business segment. This is so because firms with a single 
business segment are less complex and easier to manage. Hence the firms have 




abundantly capable replacements from within the firms. In addition, due to the 
monotonous nature of the operation, insiders are believed to be more familiar with the 
operation of the firms which places them at more advantage than the outsider 
counterparts. Hence more insiders are selected as replacements.  
 Meanwhile, older firms tend to select insider as successors as 21 out of 38 cases 
select insider successors. This may be because the older firms have established a 
succession plan and strategy. Hence, the internal candidates get promoted the position of 
CEOs. On the other hand, younger firms are more disposed to selecting outsider 
successors. As shown in panel E, 20 cases out 34 which is equivalent to 59% select 
outside successor. This could be a result of the fact that younger firms are more opened 
to creativity and innovations and as such, more inclined to hiring from the external sources 
candidates with the competitive knowledge that can measure up with the current tides and 
dynamics.  
 As for managerial ownership, the means of outsider selection sample 9%, full sample 
12% and 15% for the insider succession companies. This result indicates that firms 
dominated with managerial ownership are inclined to select insiders as a replacement, 
this could be due to the desire of the management to retain their control over the firms and 
protect their interests by selecting from amongst themselves.   
 The logit regression results displayed in Table 4 show that corporate performance 
measured by accounting performance as represented by ROA is statistically insignificant 
with p-value 0.492. Although, the coefficient is negative at -1.420, denoting a negative 
relationship between firm performance and CEO selection. This finding implies that 
performance does not necessarily lead to recruiting an outsider as a replacement. This 
result did not support the hypothesis. The possible reason for this result may be because 
the decline in the accounting performance is not significant enough compared to costs 
associated with hiring an external CEO candidate. This finding is in agreement with the 
argument of (Parrino, 1997) and a recent study from emerging markets like Malaysia 
(Ishak et al., 2012).  
 Hypothesis on board political connectedness predicts a negatively significant 
relationship between the proportion of politically connected members on the board and 
outside CEO selection. However, the result of the regression revealed an insignificant 
positive relationship. This result suggests that board political connectedness does not 
influence the choice and origin of CEO successor. The hypothesis is thus, not supported. 
The plausible reason for this finding could be as the low proportion of connected members 
on the board as the descriptive statistics in Table 2 shows an overage of 17 percent, too 
small to influence the board decision.  
 
Table 4. Regression Results for the Study 
 
Variables Coefficient Std. Error P- value 
ROA -1.420 2.068 0.492 
BPCON 0.463 1.549 0.765 
BHOWN 0.020 0.011 0.082* 
MGOWN -0.023 0.014 0.091* 
LFSIZE 0.263 0.184 0.154 
DVRSTY -0.809 0.665 0.224 
FAGE -0.020 0.015 0.184 
Constant -3.923 3.108 0.207 
Prob > chi2 0.1310  
Pseudo R2 0.1121  
Overall classification 66.67%  
* Significant at 10% 
 




The study hypothesized that blockholder ownership is positively and significantly 
associated with outside selection. The logistic regression results in Table 4 affirmed the 
postulation as the p-value is 0.082 significant at 10% level. This result means that firms 
with a high proportion of blockholder are mostly inclined to hiring their CEOs from the 
outsiders. This is consistent with the empirical findings by previous researchers on CEO 
succession (Borokhovich et al., 1996; Ishak et al., 2012; Parrino, 1997). From the 
regression result contained in Table 4, managerial ownership shows a negatively 
significant relationship with CEO selection. The logistic regression displayed a negative 
coefficient of -0.023 and p-value significant at 10% level. This result supported the 
hypothesis that managerial ownership-controlled firms are less likely to select an outsider 
as successor, they favour insider succession. This finding aligns with the argument of prior 
scholars that managerial ownership leads to management entrenchment which gives them 
control over the firms and as such can influence decisions the board regarding selection 
of CEO successor which will most likely be an insider in order to preserve their interest 
and control over the firm (Ishak, 2010; Borokhovich et al., 1996). 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
This study focused on factors that determine CEO selection in public listed companies. 
Given the scanty nature of research with regards to CEO selection in developing 
economies and Nigeria in particular, this study provides evidence on the factors 
determining CEO selection choice in the Nigerian PLCs. This is the first study to 
investigate the relationship between ownership structure, corporate performance, and 
CEO selection choice in Nigeria. The study finds that firms tend to select outsiders as 
successors when they are controlled by blockholders and managerial ownership 
dominated firms tend to select insiders as successors. In addition, firm performance 
measured by ROA and board political connectedness do not influence the choices of the 
successors.  
 Findings from this study may be useful to the board members and shareholders who 
are responsible for hiring and firing CEOs because, the selection of a successor may have 
a significant impact on firm’s future strategies, policies, and performance. In addition, the 
findings would serve as a valuable guide to the government and regulatory bodies in 
enacting and enforcing reforms that would entrench good corporate practices which will, 
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